The Political Economy of Religion and Politics in India by SIDDIQUI, Kalim
Journal of 
Economic and Social Thought 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 3                            March 2016                               Issue 1 
 
The Political Economy of Religion and Politics in 
India 
 
By Kalim SIDDIQUI
1†
 
 
Abstract. The paper will examine the dramatic rise of the right-wing Hindu organisations 
in India, especially since the 1990s. Most prominent among these organisations are RSS, 
BJP, VHP, Bajang Dal and Shiv Sena. However, they all work together under the 
philosophy of Hindutva (i.e. Hindu-ness) and are rabidly anti-minority in their stance. They 
appear to need an „enemy‟ in the form of a religious minority to unite Hindus and 
consolidate their support. This study is important because RSS is too politically significant 
to be ignored. Since the BJP (BhartiyaJanta Party) came to power in May 2014, its 
ministers and senior party leaders have been coming out in support of Hindutva. Attacks 
against Muslims have risen sharply. Cultural issues such as cow slaughter and the building 
of the Ram temple at Ayodhya have been raised again by the RSS as a means of dividing 
communities and keeping Muslims in a state of constant fear and insecurity. This study 
argues that the failure of India‟s economic development to remove socio-economic 
constraints leading to slow and uneven development has intensified rivalry between castes 
and religious communities. Under such conditions, it became possible for extremist Hindu 
organisations to target people on the basis of religion. 
Keywords.India, Hindus, Muslims, RSS, BJP, Hindutva, Communalism, and Violence. 
JEL. N30, N35, N40. 
 
1. Introduction 
his article examines the socio-economic basis of right-wing activism by 
Hindus in India. Most prominent among these organisations are RSS, BJP, 
VHP, Bajang Dal and Shiv Sena. However, all of them work together under 
the philosophy of Hindutva (i.e. Hindu-ness) and are rabidly anti-minority in their 
stance. Since the BJP (BhartiyaJanta Party) came to power, its ministers and senior 
party leaders have been coming out in support of the Hindu rastra (Hindu nation). 
They have stepped up their campaign against mixed-marriage with Muslims and 
have sought to rewrite textbooks to reflect the ideas of the RSS (RastriyaSevak 
Sangh, literally the Association of National Volunteers) (Sen, 2015). This study 
intends to analyse the ideas and philosophy of the RSS on the basis of the 
organisation‟s publications and public statements made by its leader. 
The BJP is the political front of the RSS and most of the BJP leaders, including 
the Prime Minister Modi, have been members of the RSS. Even before becoming 
Prime Minister, Modi had reaffirmed his commitment to Hindutva: “The nation 
and Hindus are one. Only if Hindus develop will the nation develop. Unity of 
Hindus will strengthen the nation” (Organiser February 11, 2007 cited in Noorani, 
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2015). BJP and RSS are fully committed to the ideology of Hindutva, which is 
deeply rooted in hatred of India‟s religious minorities, particularly Muslims and 
Christians. At present, the RSS has millions of members spread throughout most 
parts of India with more than 50,000 shakhas (branches). It also runs thousands of 
schools where young minds are poisoned with hate against Muslims. In Uttar 
Pradesh State alone, there are some 20,000 RSS-controlled shishumandir schools 
which teach that the Muslims and Christians are unreliable people stirring up 
hatred against both Muslims and Christians, with children being taught that both 
these groups are foreigners and outsiders. (Oza, 2007) 
This study is important because the RSS is too politically significant to be 
ignored and since its political wing has come to power i.e. the BJP attacks against 
Muslims have risen sharply. Cultural issues such as cow slaughter and the building 
of a Ram temple at Ayodhya have been raised again by the RSS as a means of 
dividing communities and keeping Muslims in a state of constant fear and 
insecurity. The RSS/BJP also claims that mosques at Kashi (also known as 
Varanasi) and Mathura are disputed places of worship.  
Since the BJP came to power in May 2014, religious minorities have begun to 
feel more insecure and vulnerable. Even government ministers and members of 
parliament have openly aired communalist sentiments, making hate speeches and 
inciting violence against minorities. In a recent public meeting, the BJP MP 
SakshiMaharaj is reported to have said that “Good days have come; now those with 
four wives and 40 children should not be allowed in the country” (cited in Vijayan 
& Gabriel, 2015: 22). The BJP leaders continue to spread false information about 
Muslims. They are also threatening to launch a ghar-wapsi (return home) 
programme, i.e. enforced conversion of religious minorities back to Hinduism. As 
The Economist (2015:71) commented: “The BJP‟s election victory last year was 
attributed to its promise of competence and good governance. It persuaded enough 
voters that the Hindu-nationalist part of its agenda and the shadow over […] past 
allegations of his [Modi‟s] complicity in anti-Muslim violence in the State of 
Gujarat in 2002 were marginal. Now many worry that Hindu nationalism is a pillar 
of Mr Modi‟s vision, after all”.  
The problem of communalism in India can be understood as a problem of 
community relation between Hindus and the Muslim minority. Prejudice and 
violence amongst India‟s religious communities did not decline after the creation 
of Pakistan and independence. (Siddiqui, 2013) If anything, the task of reassessing 
this situation and looking for a deeper understanding of it is even more important 
than it was previously. In the Indian context, communalism is defined as the 
„political use‟ of religion. The paper seeks to examine why religious identity in 
India became so politicised in the late 1980s. Communalism is very much a ruling 
class politics, as it reflects an underlying relationship between class and power 
relations. The struggle against communalism should be linked with a much wider 
struggle against the existing social order, as Singh (1990:19) stresses that, 
“Communalism in contemporary India, as ideology and practice, is above all an 
aspect of the politics of the ruling classes in a society with a massive feudal-
colonial inheritance, deep religious divisions, and undergoing its own, historically 
specific form of capitalist development”.  
Also we should not ignore the fact that since the 1980s socio-economic changes 
have taken place in the northern Indian cities, where a sizeable Muslim population 
live and work in handicrafts and small-scale industries. Some members of this 
community have migrated to the Middle East where the demand for their products 
has increased since the oil boom in that region. These developments have disturbed 
traditional patterns in which Muslim artisans were dependent on Hindu traders, 
both to sell their finished products and to provide them with the capital they 
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needed. The fact that some Muslim artisans have become independent 
entrepreneurs certainly exacerbated the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims. 
The local Hindu elites saw this changing situation as a threat and religion was used 
as a convenient tool with which to mobilise people. (Hasan, 1988) 
However, despite these economic improvements for some Muslims in a few 
urban centres, socio-economic conditions for the vast majority of Muslims have 
deteriorated. For example, the Justice Sachar Committee Report found that socio-
economic conditions for the Muslim community in India are abysmally low, 
marginally above that of Dalits and worse than backward castes. The Report 
particularly highlighted the under-representation of Muslims in government 
administrative services, police, and education, and their low levels of access to 
health facilities. (Noorani, 2014) This under-representation seems to be a conscious 
effort by the government to deprive them and exclude them from the government‟s 
beneficial social and economic policies fearing that Hindu extremists might see this 
as appeasement of Muslims. (Oza, 2007) 
At present, India faces an immense threat from fascism in the guise of Hindu 
nationalism. The ideology of Hindutva has received widespread coverage in the 
press in recent years, but it is a crude attempt to camouflage upper-caste Hindu 
groups, who have used religion as a tool to maintain their hegemony over the vast 
majority of the Indian people. In terms of their everyday experience, there is 
virtually nothing which would be common to all Hindus and to talk about one 
single „Hindu community‟ is misleading. Most Buddhists were converted to 
Hinduism and yet we are told that Hinduism is very tolerant religion. During 
British rule, in the census the tribal peoples were put into a separate category as 
following an „animistic‟ religion; however, after independence this category 
disappeared from government records by the time of the 1951 census, and tribal 
peoples who had not converted to Christianity were recorded by the government as 
Hindus (Singh, 2015). 
 
2. Economic Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms 
When India gained independence, the industrial bourgeoisie supported the 
Bombay Plan as a blueprint for India‟s modernisation with active state intervention 
in the economy, especially in key areas such as infrastructure and education. Public 
investments were also seen necessary to build irrigation, electricity, and steel 
industries, a policy known as „import-substitution industrialisation‟. However, the 
deepening crisis in the late 1960s in the form of slowing growth rates, rising 
deficits and external debts  (see Figure 1) led to the progressive de-regulation of the 
Indian economy with the aim of spurring growth and expanding the narrow growth 
market.  
The 1980s witnessed the coming to maturity of India‟s bourgeoisie, who was 
initially sceptical towards foreign capital and competition. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Indian ruling elites also started to look for closer integration with 
global capitalism. By the late 1980s levels of public debts rose to unprecedented 
levels (see Figure 1) and also India experienced then sharp decline in exports and 
balance of payments crisis. To resolve it, the government decided to approach 
international financial institutions including IMF. (Siddiqui, 2015a) An IMF loan 
was sought in 1991 and, in return, India was asked to make changes to its 
economic policy and the economy was opened up, imports were liberalised and 
taxes on capital were reduced. As a result, in the period from 1991 to 2001 GDP 
growth increased by 5.7% annually (See Figure 2), which shows no significant 
increase over that of 1980s. With the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms, the 
inflows of foreign capital have rapidly increased in India as shown in the Figure 3. 
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The rate of inflation has also been higher until 2010 and since then it has declined 
(see Figure 4). More disturbing is that since 1997, the agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors, which account for more than four-fifths of India‟s 
workforce, have only grown 2.3% and 4.5% respectively, compared to the 11.5% 
increase in the financial services per year (Siddiqui, 2015b). Neoliberalism can be 
said to follow specific economic policies that may not be in the interest of the 
majority of the Indian people, but in the interests of finance capital (Siddiqui, 
2012). 
 
 
Figure 1. External Debt Stocks, (current $ US) 
Source: World Development Indicator (2015) The World Bank. 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP growth (annual %) 
Source: World Development Indicator (2015) The World Bank 
 
 
Figure 3.Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (Bop, current US$) 
Source: World Development Indicator (2015) The World Bank, 
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Figure 4. Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Source: IMF, national sources 
 
The government has not paid much attention in recent decades to demand-side 
constraints, mainly focusing on supply-side constraints to alter the slow rate of 
industrialisation on the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank. We should 
not ignore the changing nature of the composition of both Indian and foreign 
markets. The reasons for the slow growth of industries could also explain lack of 
job creation. The sectoral shift in favour of services and economic liberalisation 
means the further opening up of Indian markets has led to the increase in imports 
of goods especially for the richer sections of society. Increased reliance on exports 
would mean Indian industries have to produce goods that are in demand on the 
world market, manufactured using modern technology, which is often labour-
saving. Increasing reliance on MNCs, which employ capital saving technology and 
high import intensity of domestic manufacturing, reduces the employment 
elasticity of growth. 
Neoliberalism insists on cutting fiscal deficits because it wants to reduce the 
capital expenditure of the state. This is based on the deeply flawed premise that the 
private sector will take the burden off the state, especially in a developing economy 
like India. Under neoliberalism, the market is assigned the supreme role and the 
state abdicates responsibility especially for tackling the enormous growing 
inequalities and making economic policies subservient to international finance 
capital. (Girdner & Siddiqui, 2008) Development is defined merely as an increase 
in growth rates achieved by “encouraging” inflow of foreign capital by 
multinational companies. Such pro-foreign business policy also requires facilitating 
corporate takeovers of domestic businesses, lands and mineral resources from rural 
people. (Siddiqui, 2014a) 
During the second term of the Congress Party government, the economic crisis 
increased. At an aggregate level, the GDP growth rates sharply declined from 8.6% 
per annum in 2009-2010 to 4.7% in 2013-14. (Siddiqui, 2014b) The fiscal deficit 
also rose to new heights. In addition, the rate of inflation remained at very high 
levels of over 10% per annum for the period 2010-2014 whilst unemployment also 
remained high. Moreover, a large number of financial scams linked to the 
Commonwealth Games, 2G frequency allocations, and the coal scams further 
tarnished the government‟s image. Since the adoption of neoliberal reforms, India 
has undergone substantial transformation. The nature of exploitation has changed 
and some sections of society have become relatively affluent, while many others 
have faced dispossession and joblessness. The right-wing Hindu organisations were 
able to channel this discontent among the people and as a result the BJP led by 
Modi came to power in May 2014.  
In the name of economic reforms, Modi‟s government strategy seems to be to 
cut subsidies, increase regressive taxes and capital expenditure and privatise public 
sector banks and state-owned enterprises such as the Indian Railways. It has also 
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undertaken capital expenditure projects such as setting up smart cities. All these 
measures will certainly accelerate the process of handing the Indian economy over 
to the big corporations, who financed him and supported his rise to power. 
However, neoliberal policies to deliver growth are already exhausted. Providing 
a further dose will hardly provide any new impetus. In the recent past i.e. in 2008 
with the advent of the global financial crisis, a number of measures helped to 
restore growth temporarily, including the provision of loans for housing and 
consumer goods to boost middle-class demand. (Siddiqui, 2014c) But this has its 
own limitations bringing the risk of credit bubbles and balance of payments 
difficulties given the high import content of middle-class consumption. 
 
3. Religious Rivalry in the Colonial Period 
Communalism is often viewed as the product of religion when in reality it is the 
product of competitive politics. It would be unfair to simply place all the blame for 
religious violence on British colonial rulers. However, divisions between Hindus 
and Muslims were aggravated during the colonial period when Muslims constituted 
about 25% of India‟s population. During the 1930s, difficulties arose regarding 
how to share political power in provincial governments and government jobs 
between Hindus and Muslims. This could not be resolved to the satisfaction of 
these two communities and as a result differences and tensions between the two 
communities widened. Religious issues such as cow slaughter and playing music in 
front of mosques became important conflict issues. This was deliberately done by 
the Hindu extremists to antagonise Muslims. (Engineer, 1995; Chandra, 1984) 
The anti-colonial movement was massive in terms of popular participation, in 
the hopes of a more egalitarian society, but in practice did not go far enough to 
resolve caste and class contradictions. Instead it found it convenient to mobilise 
people on the basis of caste and religious identities. Episodes of religious violence 
were not witnessed in the pre-colonial period in India, only during British rule, and 
their intensity increased during partition in 1947. Moreover, the colonial 
government manipulated religious sentiments to their own advantage, as Chandra 
(1984:40-41)notes: “Communalism was an expression of and deeply rooted in the 
interests, aspirations, outlook and attitude and psychology and point of view of the 
middle classes in a social situation characterised by economic stagnation and the 
absence of a vigorous struggle to transform society–the communal question was a 
petty bourgeois question par excellence”.  
British rule had proved to be oppressive for both Hindus and Muslims. 
Moreover, British colonialism had impacted on Indian people in various ways. For 
instance the poverty, misery and indebtedness of the peasantry were increased. 
Dadabhai Naoroji estimated and examined the causes of poverty in the last decade 
of the 19th century in India. His findings were used by Indian nationalist leaders as 
an economic critique of British rule in India. Naoroji attempted to demonstrate 
statistically that poverty of India was attributed to specific imperial institutions and 
policies (Siddiqui, 1990). Summarising Naoroji‟s conclusions, Sarkar (2008:433-
434) argues that this „drain of wealth‟ to Britain was the result of the “remittances 
of government funds and profits of private British capitalists, excessive revenue 
pressures, an alleged destruction of indigenous handicrafts, hindrances to nascent 
Indian industries etc.” 
After India had been occupied, the British colonial rulers introduced three major 
changes in the land revenue policy of the earlier rulers such Alauddin Khiljee and 
Akbar. Under the Mughal rulers, if a peasant had access to, say, 100 acres but only 
cultivated only 50 acres, he was then only asked to pay revenue on the actual 
amount cultivated i.e. 50 acres. However, the British colonial rulers drastically 
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changed the basis of levying revenue from the land cultivated to the land owned. 
Under the British, peasants had to pay for the entire 100 acres of land, whether it is 
cultivated or not, and revenue was collected on the basis of land owned. (Bagchi, 
2010)  
Another difference witnessed was that under the Mughal system, revenue was 
collected from the peasantry after the crop was harvested, but whereas the British 
changed this to before the harvest, which meant that peasants were forced to 
borrow money in order to pay their rent. By introducing these changes the British 
were able to raise revenue, but indebtedness among the peasantry increased. 
Another major policy change which occurred was that under the Mughals, 
concessions were available in the case of crop failure, but the British discontinued 
such practices. In addition the Mughals re-invested some part of the collected 
revenue in the community, but under the British the entire revenue was either used 
to finance colonial wars taking place elsewhere or was repatriated to Britain. 
(Bagchi, 2010) As a result impoverishment increased, leading to increased inter-
religious rivalry among people.  
During the Mughal period, only peasants could acquire the land of another 
peasant. But this practice was changed by the British, who allowed anyone who 
had the money to do so to buy land and displace peasants. As a result, due to rising 
indebtedness, large amounts of land passed into the hands of money lenders and 
traders. Later on de-industrialisation took place in India, which led to the de-
urbanisation of India‟s cities and as a result of India‟s declining textile exports, the 
urban population moved to the villages and thus agriculture was overburdened 
(Siddiqui, 1990). Moreover, the British colonial government played an important 
role in promoting sectarian consciousness and communalism in order to „divide 
and rule‟, especially after the 1857 Mutiny. Then the colonial government began 
dealing with the two communities i.e. Hindus and Muslims separately. Hasan 
(1982:26) notes: “The introduction of separate electorates was one of such favours. 
It was also seen as a counterpoise to the growing strength of the anti-colonial 
movement. The principle of communal representation inevitably leads to the 
creation of political camps organised against each other and teaches men to think 
as partisans and not citizens”. 
It seems useful to briefly discuss the development of modern businesses in 
India, especially in the 20th century. Indian businesses are embodiments of pre-
industrial forms of capital accumulation through money lending and trading. 
During the two World Wars and the Great Depression they had more freedom in 
the sense of setting up industries and had capital accumulation including black 
marketing and swindling in government contracts. British interests were more 
diverted towards railways, engineering, jute and tea plantations (Tyabji, 2015). 
Levkovsky (1966) also argues that development of businesses in India under 
British rule was very different from that in West European countries. Unlike in 
Western Europe, in India, the emergence of industries did not follow a transition 
from independent artisans to manually operated manufacturers to modern power-
driven factories. In India, manufacturers were closely linked with the merchants‟ 
and usurers‟ capital. For a relatively long period, manufacturers continued to 
engage in money lending and trading along with industrial operations (Levkovsky, 
1966). 
In fact, merchant and usury capital and industrial capital are distinct forms of 
capital that employ different methods of accumulation. Merchant capital generates 
profits through buying and selling commodities, usury capital makes profits 
through the interest on loans advanced by money lenders, while industrial capital 
on the other hand makes profits by buying raw materials and employing workers 
and producing manufactured products and innovations of new products. In the 
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West European countries, with the expansion of industries the importance of 
industrial capital increased over time, while the merchant capital operation 
declined relatively. The usury role also declined over time with the decline of 
peasant-based agriculture. However, contrary to this, in India it did not happen, as 
Tyabji (2015:102) observed,“the existence of a class of businessmen does not 
automatically mean the existence of a group of industrially oriented entrepreneurs, 
because the development of industries is not necessarily the only money-making 
activity available to these businessmen…In the Indian case, colonialism and 
„arrested development‟ formed the context within which emerged the group of 
businessmen responsible for managing industrial ventures after independence. 
They were part of an imperfectly formed group of industrialists possessing 
characteristics that reflected their background of engagement in non-industrial 
activities; activities which they continued to be involved, even as they acquired 
control over industrial companies”. 
 
4. The Ideology and Philosophy of the RSS 
The RSS was founded by K.B. Hedgewar in Nagpur in 1925 and B.S. Moonje 
was also among its founder. (Noorani, 2000) All founders of the RSS were from 
the Brahmin castes of the Maharashtra. It is very interesting to mention here that in 
mid-1920 in Nagpur town a minor conflict took place between Muslims and 
Hindus due to the playing of loud music in front of a mosque. On this incident, 
Hedgewar and Moonje,who were both member of Hindu Mahasbha, actively 
participated and held protests on this issue. This is how the incident was described 
in Hedgewar‟s biography, “Because of the in-built fear of Muslims among the 
Hindus, the band troupes sometimes shirked to play before the mosque. On such 
occasions Hedgewar himself would take over the drums and rouse the dormant 
manliness of Hindus”. (Despande & Ramswamy, 1981:71 cited in Bhatt, 2001:117) 
Hindu Mahasabha (hence Mahasabha) is another rabid anti-Muslim 
organisation which has been working closely with the RSS. V.D. Savarkar was the 
president of the Mahasabha in 1937-42. He tried to define nationalism on the basis 
of identity through stigmatisation and „threatening others‟. The RSS is firmly 
established as an anti-minorities political group viewing the Muslim community in 
particular as „threatening others‟. According to him, Hindutva rests on three 
attributes:namely, geographical unity, racial features and common culture. His 
social and cultural characteristics stemmed from the mythical reconstruction of the 
so-called Vedic Golden Age. Savarkar wanted to see Muslims and Christian living 
in India as subordinates as according to him they represented „others‟, who had 
converted few generations ago and he suggested they should be made to convert 
back to Hinduism (Savarkar, 1989). 
Members of Mahasbha began as a pressure group within the Congress party. As 
a result of differences, its members were excluded from the Congress party in 1937 
on accounts of communalist activities, but some important Mahasabha leaders 
continued to be part of Congress Party as Madan Mohan Malviyaalso happened to 
be also the founder of Banaras Hindu University.P. Tandon, who was the leader of 
the Congress Party in UP state, openly opposed to providing any recognition or 
preservation of a specificallyMuslim Indian identity. He said, “They [Muslim] 
should accept Indian culture. One culture and one language will pave the way for 
real unity. Urdu symbolises a foreign culture. Hindi alone can be the unifying 
factor for the diverse forces in the country”. (Nation Herald, 15 June, 1948, p.7, 
cited in Jaffrelot, 1996:97) 
Savarkar‟s ideas on religious minorities initially influenced the RSS. On 
Hindus, Savarkar (1989: 92) argues: “Hindus are bound together not only by the 
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ties of the love we to bear for a common fatherland and by common blood […] but 
also by the tie of the common homage we pay to our great civilisation – our Hindu 
culture, […] language, Sanskrit, which has been the chosen means of expression 
and preservation of that culture, of all that was best and worth-preserving in the 
history of our race”.  
According to Savarkar, Muslims and Christians are not part of his concept of 
„nation‟ because of their cultural differences. “Their [Muslims and Christians] holy 
land is far off in Arabia and Palestine. Their mythology and Prophets ideas and 
heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their names and their outlook 
smack of foreign origin” (Savarkar, 1989:113) When Savarkar took over as 
president of the Hindu Mahasbha, further close cooperation were developed 
between the two organisations i.e. RSS and Mahasbha. Even before him from 1926 
to 1931 Hedgewar had been secretary of the Hindu Mahasbha. In 1939 at the 21st 
session of the Hindu Mahasbha, Savarkar compared the Muslim question in India 
with the Jewish „problem‟ in Germany: “…the Muslims are on the whole more 
inclined to identify themselves and their interests with Muslims outside India than 
Hindus who live next door, like Jews in Germany”. (Bombay Chronicle, 29 
December 1939, cited in Casolari, 2000:224) 
Golwalkar took over leadership of the RSS in 1940 and remained head of the 
organisation until his death some three decades later. Golwalkar said that only one 
„race‟ (i.e. Hindus) constituted the nation in India. Golwalkar‟s book was published 
before the Muslim League Lahore Resolution (1940) in acceptance of two-nation 
theory (Golwalkar, 1939). He always emphasised that Hindus alone, as the 
privileged community in India, should rule the country. He did not approve of 
democracy which he thought of as being alien to the Hindu ethos and extolled the 
code of Manu, whom he admires „as the first greatest and the wisest law giver of 
mankind‟. On the question of non-Hindus, Golwalkar declared: “The non-Hindu in 
Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu religion […] or may stay in the country 
wholly subordinate to the Hindu nation claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, 
far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen‟s rights”. According to him: “in 
Hindustan exists and must needs exist [sic] the ancient Hindu nation and nothing 
else but the Hindu nation. All those not belonging to the national, i.e. Hindu race, 
religion, culture and language, naturally beyond the pale of real „National‟ life… so 
long, however, as they maintain their racial, religion and cultural differences, they 
[minorities] cannot but be only foreigners”. (Golwalkar, 1939:45-46)  
Furthermore, the British colonial officials never considered the RSS to be 
working against their interests. Neither Hedgewar nor Golwalkar joined the anti-
colonial movement, opting instead in favour of „character building‟ tasks. (Bhatt, 
2001; Anderson & Shridhar, 1987) Also L.K. Advani, leader of the BJP, narrates: 
“I joined [RSS] about the same time [1942] as the „quit India‟ movement. I joined a 
couple of months earlier but my motivation was the conviction that India would 
neverattain independence by the methods the Congress was commanding. Much 
more was needed and the RSS approach used to be that unless we first build, form 
a nucleus of people willing to sacrifice their life for the country India would not 
become independent”. (Interview with Advani on 11 February 1994, cited in 
Jafferlot, 1996:72) 
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the 1930‟s inspired the RSS leaders 
especially their dream to build an authoritarian and disciplined organisation as the 
Nazis had done. While supporting Nazi Germany for racial purity and national 
building, Golwalkar (1939:37) said: “To keep up the purity of the race and its 
culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging their country of the Semitic 
race – the Jews. Race pride is its highest has been manifested here. Germany has 
shown how well-nigh impossible it is for the races and cultures, having differences 
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going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us, in 
Hindustan to learn and profit by”.  
Golwalkar was strongly influenced by J.K Bluntschili‟s works namely the 
theory of the state. Bluntschili argues that there is an advantage to having one 
single nationality: “The contacts between fascism and Hindu Nationalism were the 
attempt to militarise Hindu society and to create a militant Hindu mentality among 
Hindus […] At an ideological level, the most meaningful effect of the fascist 
influence is represented by the way in which Hindu nationalism developed its own 
concept of diversity, transforming „diverse‟ people into enemies. Of course, the 
concept of the internal enemy is already implicitly contained in Savarkar‟s 
Hindutva. Nevertheless, the continuous reference to German racial policy and the 
comparison of the Jewish problem in Germany with the Muslim question in India 
reveals the evolution of the concept of the „internal enemy‟ along explicitly fascist 
lines”. (Casolari, 2000:227) 
There is clear evidence that the Hindu extremist organisations had links with the 
fascist parties in Europe. (Casolari, 2000) B.S. Moonje visited Italy in 1930, where 
he met Mussolini; other Mahasbha leaders such as S.P. Mookerjee also established 
contact with Italian academic institutions. The RSS leader Golwalkar himself used 
the definition of nation put forward by German Nazi writer J.K. Bluntschili, 
namely: “It is a union of masses of men of different occupation and social status, in 
a hereditary society of common spirit, feeling and race bound together especially 
by a language and customs in a common civilisation which gives them a sense of 
unity and distinction from all foreigners, quite apart from the bond of the state”. 
(Golwalkar, 1939:19) 
On the question of authoritarian and secrecy within the RSS organisation Bhatt 
(2001:116) notes, “The RSS organisation structures promote an authoritarian 
institutional secrecy that conceal the internal workings of the organisation and 
conflict and dissension within it, particularly conflict among its leaders… The RSS 
literature is also deeply imbued with a dense, carefully cultivated ideological 
language that inscribes its own political imaginary onto the realities it is ostensibly 
claiming to describe. One other factor relates to the RSS‟s description of itself as a 
„non-political‟ organisation, an appellation that has permeated relatively objective 
studies of the RSS… for not participating in the anti-colonial movement and the 
conditions related to the lifting of ban on the organisation in the immediate post-
independence period… [Despite that] the RSS has not refrained from active 
political interventions from its inception”.  
The RSS has always claimed that it is not a political but cultural and social 
organisation (Anderson & Shridhar, 1987). However, BJP leader and former Chief 
Minister of UP state Kalyan Singh contradicted, the above claim and he said: “I 
have spent a greater part of my life in this organisation [RSS] and I can say the 
right from the distribution of election tickets [to candidates] in BJP to selecting 
cabinet ministers, it is only the RSS which calls the shots. What else is political 
activity?” (Noorani, 2000:12). 
 
5. Views on Historical Events 
The communalist and sectarian views on past historical events are defined by 
the RSS as true nationalism. It emphasises that India belongs to the majority 
community and has been formed by their history, religion and culture alone. Due to 
the differences with Mahatma Gandhi on these very issues Savarkar dismissed him 
as a „pseudo nationalist‟ (Savarkar, 1989). The RSS uses religious consciousness to 
mobilise Hindus for their narrow political ends.  
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Hindu communalist ideology is derived from historical and political 
assumptions and is thus unable to stand up to scrutiny on the basis of logic and 
rationality. Therefore, it is important to discuss some important historical facts. It is 
very important to understand history on the basis of facts, and a rational and logical 
explanation of history and any distortion of these facts may lead to wholly 
misunderstanding past events in India. Communalism in India draws its sustenance 
from a selective interpretation of history seeking to construct an „imagined‟ past to 
support its views. As Panikkar (1997:73) explains, “The Hindu view highlights the 
glory of the ancient past and tries to appropriate its heritage, ignoring at the same 
time the rich contribution of the medieval period to the making of the composite 
culture of India.” Furthermore, on the notion of Hinduism as a homogeneous 
religion, Panikkar (1997: 73-74) writes: “Did Hinduism as a coherent religion exist 
from ancient times? The early sources indicate that it did not; it was encompassed 
in a series of parallel systems, consisting of a large number of independent sects. 
These sects did not have a single source of origin. […] The historicity of Hinduism 
is a relatively recent construction, undertaken in the 19th century as a part of 
reformist-revivalist movements”.  
Similar points have been made by Romila Thapar. According to her, Hinduism 
has been practised in many ways, and the consolidation of this religion occurred 
after the Christian missionaries came to India, and Hindu reform movements began 
to consolidate against new challenges and tried to unify Hindus into one 
community. (Thapar, 1989) 
Hindu extremists have been misleading the people on the issue of beef eating. 
They choose to forget that beef eating was common in ancient India, as Swami 
Vivekananda said on 2nd February 1900 in his talk on „Buddhist India‟ in 
California, USA that „Hindus on ceremonial and special occasions sacrificed bull 
and ate it. Beef eating was common among Aryans, during the Vedic period‟. On 
the question of beef eating Manusmriti(Hindu religious book) in Chapter V 
provides details of different kinds of animals to be consumed. B.R. Ambedkar also 
wrote a paper titled „Did the Hindus Never Eat Beef?‟ where he quoted from the 
ancient Hindu scriptures that beef eating was prevalent in ancient India or Vedic 
India. He concludes that “the Aryans of the Rig Veda did kill cows for purposes of 
food and ate beef”.This is abundantly clear from the Rig Veda itself, as Rig Veda 
(X.91.14) narrates that „sacrificed horses, bulls, oxen, barren cows and 
rams…[were] killed with a sword or axe” (Ambedkar, 1990:323).  
The RSS assumes that Hindu culture and Indian nationalism is Hindu nationalism. 
The selective approach to looking at the past and only taking into consideration the 
Hindu experience denies the composite culture and traditions of India. Therefore, 
the RSS‟s interpretation of India‟s past is incorrect. Such an approach ignores the 
complex historical processes by which composite culture developed in India. 
Cultural development must embrace various sources which have come from 
different religions such as Buddhism and Jainism and also from religious 
influences which came from outside such as Islam and Christianity. As Panikkar 
emphasises that, “Whether India developed as a melting pot of cultures or only 
remained a salad bowl is no more the issue. The crucial question is whether Indian 
culture is conceived as a static phenomenon, tracing its identity to a single 
unchanging source, or a dynamic phenomenon, critically and creatively 
interrogating all that is new.” (K.N. Panikkar cited by Hamid Ansari, April 2, 
2016). 
Looking at India‟s history through the religion of its rulers emerged during the 
British colonial period, when for the first time James Mill divided Indian history 
into three periods: the Hindu, the Muslim and the British. Such interpretations 
suited British colonial rulers, who were keen to hold on their power on the basis of 
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„divide and rule‟. This religious-centred interpretation of history is wrong. To 
communalise historical events and characterise ruling class wars as religious strife 
is absolutely false. For example, the battle between Akbar and Maharana Pratap 
was purely for political power. There was no strictly religious division in the 
struggle, as both sides had the support of both Muslims and Hindus. The 
RajputHindu elites supported Akbar for territorial and political expansion. 
Similarly the battle between the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb and Shivaji and that 
between Tipu Sultan and Malabar local elites were the same; these were never 
considered religious wars. As Panikkar (1997:75) observes: “The Raja of Amber 
[who was a Hindu Rajput] sided with [Mughal emperor] Akbar against Maharana 
Pratap. Sultan Mahmud Lodi and Hasan Khan Mewati assisted Rana Sanga against 
Babur; and the Sultan of Jaunpur joined forces with a Hindu chieftain to fight 
against the Muslim rulers of Kapila. The history of India abounds with such 
examples. It should be obvious that medieval monarchs were influenced more by 
political compulsions than by religious considerations”. Mughal emperors had 
Hindu generals in their army and as advisors. Among the nine distinguished 
advisors of the Mughal emperor Akbar, most were Hindus. (Chandra, 1984; 
Kosambi, 1962) 
During the medieval period Hindu-Muslim relations were harmonious, not ones 
of strife and confrontation, as claimed by the Hindu extremists. Both communities 
lived together peacefully without inter-community violence and bitterness. The 
integration between the two communities can be seen on the tombs of the Sufis i.e. 
khanqas. The Sufis provided a means of incorporating Hindu religious customs and 
beliefs into their mass prayers. However, such positive messages and practices 
have been conveniently ignored by the RSS and its affiliated organisations. 
The RSS claims that in 1528 the Mughal King Babur destroyed a Hindu temple 
to build a mosque. This was based on a mythical story without any archaeological 
evidence to support the existence of a temple on the site of the Babri mosque. In 
1949 after an idol of Ram was placed in the mosque, the district authorities found 
that some local Hindu extremists had been responsible. Soon after, the District 
Magistrate K.K. Nair was told by the provincial government to remove the idol. 
Nair ignored the government order leaving the administration shortly after to join 
the RSS. He was later elected in to the state legislative assembly on the BJP ticket. 
(Gopal, 1991)  
However, there is no mention in any historical text from that period of the 
destruction of a Hindu temple. For example, Abu Fazal in his book Ain-i-Akbari 
did not mention of any destruction of a temple of Ram at Ayodhya. Tulsidas the 
well-known devotee of Lord Ram and author of the holy book Ramayana who 
lived during the Babur period, did not mention any such incident. It mentioned for 
first time by P. Carnegy, a colonial administrator, in his book in 1870. His main 
source was a local Hindu priest, who told him about the construction of Babri 
mosque on the temple of Ram. A few years later, this story was again narrated by 
another colonial district administrator H.R. Neville, whose source was Carnegy. 
Sarkar (1999) suggests that RSS claims of peaceful ancient Hindu rulers are far 
from historically accurate. Commenting on the so-called peaceful expansion, 
Sarkar (1999:1693) observes: “Brahminical Hindu rituals, beliefs and caste 
disciplines have spread across the sub-continent and penetrated and sought to 
transform communities with initially very different practices and faiths. It has 
somehow become conventional to describe the processes here by anodyne terms 
like „Sanskritisation‟ or „cultural integration‟ but they really amount nevertheless 
what with other religious traditions would have been termed „conversion‟”.  
Lack of unity amongst Hindus has been highlighted, as according to Dube 
(1965:423): “[Hindu religious textbooks] provide not one model but many models 
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of Hindu religion […] what we call Hindu philosophy is not just one school of 
thought, it is compendium of many systems of thought, recognising and advocating 
many divergent images of society and many different schemes of values”.  
There is rather a constant effort at identification with religious community, as 
well as, for Hindu majoritarian communalists, with nationalism. Consider for 
instance the very term „Hindutva‟, which literally means no more than „Hindu-
ness‟, but has come to be a self-description, from the mid-1920s onwards, of a 
much more specific and narrow ideology.According to R.S. Sharma (1990:3-4): 
“The advent of such religions as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam helped to 
reform and reorganise society and economy on healthier lines… But it has to be 
understood that every religion is the product of a certain type of social milieu […] 
Buddhism emphasis on the protection of all beings in general and the cows in 
particular helped to promote agriculture”.  
On the issue of plundering Hindu temples, Sharma emphasises that the causes 
of such actions must be explained. He further says: “In general the temples were 
relatively far wealthier than the mosques. In the early 11th century the Somnath 
temple had 500 devadasis, 300 barbers and numerous priests. It was endowed with 
as many as 10,000 villages. […] It is because of accumulation of wealth in the 
temples that some Hindu rulers appointed special officers for destroying idols 
made of precious metal and seizing wealth for the treasury. Such was the case with 
Harsha who ruled in Kashmir at the end of the 11th century, and had appointed an 
officer whose function was concerned with that of uprooting of idols (devotpatana). 
The appointment of such officers and the measures recommended in the 
Arthashastra of Kautilya to raise money from the credulous people by superstitious 
devices will dispel the idea that members of the Hindu ruling class have been 
consistently tolerant towards their subjects”. (Sharma, 1990:8) 
On the question of religious tolerance Kosambi argues that attitudes towards 
religious tolerance or otherwise in both ancient and medieval India were to a 
certain extent related to the availability of resources. A tolerant or eclectic attitude 
would become pronounced during a period of comparative prosperity but it would 
tend to recede into the background in a situation of scarcity and fall in revenues. As 
Kosambi (1962:29) observes, “With the Mughal prosperity at its height Akbar 
could dream of a synthetic Din-i-Ilahi; Aurangzeb could only augment his falling 
revenues by increased religious persecution in the Jizya tax on unbelievers”.  
In the Mughal period, tolerance was seen to a prudent policy of governance and 
under the umbrella of Sulh-i-Kul, i.e. „absolute peace‟. It was proclaimed that the 
King, like God, must favour all without discrimination. Not only Akbar but even 
Aurangzeb used it to win Rajput support. Recent research shows that the Mughal 
Emperor Aurangzeb had issued jagirs and cash gifts for the maintenance of famous 
temples, namely, Somesh war Nath Mahadev temple located at Allahabad; 
Mahakaleshwara temple situated at Ujjain; Balajitemple at Chitrakut; Uman and a 
temple at Gauhati; the Jain temple of Shatrunjal; and other temples and gurudwaras 
scattered over northern India.  Pande found that Aurangzeb ordered destruction of 
temples and mosques, for example, the Vishvanathtemple at Varanasi and the 
mosque at Golkunda. The reasons have to be examined in proper historical 
perspective. The temple had become the centre of conspiracy against the state and 
similarly with the mosque. Pande concluded that Aurangzeb had ordered to raid the 
temple to rescue women members of the family of a Minister of Rajasthan who had 
gone there on pilgrimage. In Golkunda state, a Muslim ruler, after collecting 
revenue of the state, did not pay his dues to the Imperial Authority at Delhi. He had 
buried wealth (gold and silver) and erected a Mosque over it. When Aurangzeb 
came to know about it, he ordered the demolition of the mosque. Recent 
researchers have refuted the charge against Aurangzeb that he was an anti-Hindu 
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monarch and established that Aurangzeb did not make any distinction between 
temples and mosques so far as state administration was concerned. (Panikkar et al., 
2002; Pande, 2006) 
However, anti-colonial movements under the Congress Party had severe 
limitations. Its leaders were closely identified with narrow sectarian religious 
issues and were involved in cow protection societies and were also active in 
sectarian religious societies such as Arya Samaj and Mahasabha. The Congress 
Party also used religious symbols and consciousness to mobilise the people. In 
Maharashtra its leader Tilak employed Shivaji to mobilise the people and in Uttar 
Pradesh and Bengal the traders and landlords who formed the leadership of the 
Congress Party, took an active part in campaigns against cow slaughter and also 
encouraged revivalist thinking and came out strongly in favour of a social system 
based on the principles of Hinduism. 
On 30th January 1948 Mahatma Gandhi was murdered by Nathuram Goodse, a 
former member of the RSS who nonetheless maintained very close links with the 
organisation. After Gandhi‟s assassination, India‟s Home Minister Sardar Patel told 
the RSS leaders that in order to lift the ban on the RSS, they must have a written 
constitution, be committed to democratic procedures to renounce violence, and 
accept the constitution of India and the Indian flag (Jaffrelot, 1996). Patel wrote to 
S.P. Mookerjee on 18 July 1948: “As regards the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha 
the case relating to Gandhiji‟s murder is sub judice and I should not like to say 
anything about the participation of the two organisations, but our reports do 
confirm that, as a result of the activities of these two bodies, particularly the 
former, an atmosphere was created in the country in which such a ghastly tragedy 
became possible”. (Sardar Patel‟s Correspondence, vol. 6:323, cited in Noorani, 
2015) 
After independence, the weaknesses in the implementation of the land reforms 
and also failures to curtail the socio-economic powers of the landlords and money 
lenders gave further opportunities to obstructionist forces. Moreover, the reliance 
on traders and big land owners for political support compelled the government to 
compromise with the divisive communalist forces. (Siddiqui, 1997) The deepening 
of economic crisis in the post-independent period created conditions in which 
community, caste and class rivalry and competition were aggravated. As Hasan 
(1982:30) notes: “Economic development in the post-independent period was 
retarded and slow; consequently, politics and mobilisation took place around 
individuals, factions, and communities rather than on issues of development and 
reforms. Hindus and Muslims have been interlocked in a competition for survival 
and advancement magnified against the backdrop of underdevelopment”. 
During elections the Congress Party extended patronage to powerful 
individuals. This was seen as being convenient because Muslim electoral support 
has depended on addressing their grievances and all efforts were sought to gain 
support of conservative elements such as the Imams for delivering votes. 
Unfortunately more than six decades of democratic process have not only failed to 
undermine religious and caste solidarity, but in fact in recent years such tendencies 
have strengthened. 
 
6. The Rise of the BJP 
Prior to the 1980s, the predecessor of the BJP, Jana Sangh, had very little 
popular support. The BJP party had initially drawn its support mainly from upper-
caste Hindus. V.D. Savarkar‟s and Golwalkar‟s elaboration of Hindutva provided 
the foundation for the RSS, which was later on transformed into the political party, 
which is now known as BJP. (Corbridge & Harris, 2000; Graham, 1990)  
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The BJP rose to power at a remarkable pace; the two seats it had in 1989 had 
risen to 119 by 1996. It was then still a minority party in the lower house of the 
Indian parliament which has 543 members in total. (Vanaik, 2001) The BJP 
benefitted from a political and ideological vacuum, situating itself as an alternative 
to the Congress Party, at a time when people were disillusioned with the Congress 
party as the government was consistently facing accusations of corruption. At a 
time of economic crisis and uncertainty, the concept of Hindu unity functioned as a 
means of social stabilisation. The BJP put itself forward as the defender of “Hindu 
society” and continued with its use of offensive propaganda against the Muslim 
community. A central element in this re-orientation was the Shah Bano case and 
the Ayodhya campaign. As Ahmed has observed regarding communalism, “as an 
aggressive kind of rightist nationalism [...] it takes advantage of the misery of the 
masses”. (Ahmed, 2004:23) 
The Supreme Court of India took a decision on the Shah Bano case which 
concerned maintenance for a divorced Muslim wife in her favour. This was seen by 
Muslim organisations as interference in Shariah Law, which being a divine, they 
believe is ordained by God and not to be changed. Without realising long term 
consequences, Muslim organisations organised protests and Rajiv Gandhi‟s 
government amended the law in their favour (Engineer, 1995) On February 25 
1986, the Muslim Women‟s Bill was moved in Parliament to override the Supreme 
Court‟s ruling in the Shah Bano case. This provided new ammunition for right-
wing Hindu organisations, who referred to this as „appeasement‟ of Muslims and 
they mobilised Hindus against it. Under pressure to tackle Hindu grievances, Rajiv 
Gandhi‟s government opened the doors of Babri mosque at Ayodhya for Hindus to 
worship there. (Girdner & Siddiqui, 1990)  
Right-wing Hindu organisations appealed to those who had enough of the 
Congress Party‟s corruption, nepotism and inefficiency and were looking for an 
alternative. These organisations carefully projected themselves as the alternative to 
Congress misrule presenting themselves as being principled, honest and 
disciplined. They even denied their communalist and fascist character, but not for 
long. In the late 1990s they projected Vajpayee as a „moderate‟ and liberal leader. 
But he later admitted that this liberal stance had been dictated by political 
expediency. 
In August 1990, the then Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced his 
government‟s decision to implement the Mandal Commission Report which 
recommended that 27% of government jobs to should be reserved for other 
„backward castes‟. The fear of losing the support of upper-caste Hindus, due to the 
Mandal Commission proposals These two above reasons seemed to be important 
reasons for the BJP‟s decision to mobilise Hindus and campaign to build Ram 
temple at Ayodhya. The BJP‟s political force remained confined to the north and 
western Indian states until the mid-1990s. As Jaffrelot (1996:7) observes: “Largely 
due to the stress it put on a Sanskritised culture, an upper caste (largely 
Brahminical) ethos which was more prevalent in North India and an anti-Muslim 
attitude to which South India was less receptive given the greater integration of 
Islam in this region…Up to the 1980s, in effect Hindu nationalism recruited most 
of its supporters among the urban upper caste, middle caste and the landed elite of 
North India”. 
Moreover, state-owned television aired weekly instalments of a serialisation of 
the Ramayana which glorified the past. This strengthened Hindus‟ religious 
sentiments and beliefs (Corbridge & Harris, 2000). People‟s frustration and 
grievances were fully exploited by the right-wing Hindu organisations and they 
were successful in exploiting the disillusionment of the people. 
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If anything can be learnt from the past experiences and policies then, it seems 
that Congress Party had been peddling soft Hindutva whilst the BJP peddled a 
hard-core version. The Congress Party felt if it antagonised both Muslims and 
Hindu right-wing extremists then it would not be able to win elections. The 
Congress Party did not have the will and determination to take on Hindu extremists 
and punish them for the crimes against minorities. Therefore, it appears to have put 
winning elections before its principles. 
V.P. Singh‟s National Front coalition government came to power in 1989 and 
adopted an ambivalent policy towards Babri mosque. In order to consolidate his 
power and its electoral victory he showed his intention to implement the Mandel 
Commission‟s recommendations, which was supposed to increase the 
representation of lower castes in government jobs, traditionally the domain of the 
Hindu upper castes. As a reaction to this in August 1990 L.K. Advani launched his 
rath yatra (literally, chariot procession) through the northern Indian states, starting 
from Somnath temple in Gujarat and to end ending at the Babri mosque in 
Ayodhya. In each town that his procession passed through, communal riots and 
violence against Muslims flared up and community relations worsened, 
culminating in the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 (Vanaik, 2001; Graham, 
1990), an act of destruction for which no one was prosecuted. As Bhatt (2001:170) 
observes: “The emergence in 1984 of an organised mass campaign by VHP for the 
building of a Ram temple on the site of the medieval Babri mosque in Ayodhya, 
Uttar Pradesh; secular protest against a Hindu nationalist defence of the self-
immolation of the widow RoopKanwar in Rajasthan in 1987, […] „Communal 
violence‟, directed against Muslim and Sikh communities, increased dramatically 
in India during the 1980s”.  
The parliamentary election of 1996 was one of the most dramatic in the political 
history of India when Hindu communalist organisations led by BJP and Shiv Sena 
emerged as the largest single bloc in the Indian parliament. With this campaign the 
party mobilised all corners of India with the aim of uniting Hindus, although it 
inflamed violence and undermined the harmony among the different communities 
(Siddiqui, 2009a) However, the BJP gained politically and won 161 seats in 1996 
and then 182 seats in 1999. The RSS is the organisational strength of the BJP. The 
BJP senior leaders pledged their allegiance to the RSS. The relationship between 
BJP and the RSS was very close and as stated by former BJP leader Mr. A.B 
Vajpayee in 1997: “The post [of Prime Minister] may go tomorrow, but I will 
always remain a humble swayamasevak [RSS volunteer/activist]” (Noorani, 
2000:4). 
 
7. Communalist Attacks against Minorities 
The socio-economic crisis worsened in India in the 1960s with the Sino-India 
war in 1962 and the India-Pakistan war in 1965. As a result, there was further 
slowing down of growth rates and food shortages, and the tensions between Hindus 
and Muslims re-emerged in the late 1960s. It is well known that in India 
communalist violence did not occur spontaneously and was rarely caused by 
religious animosity. Cultural and religious differences rarely led to the kind of 
organised attacks and large scale violence seen in recent years. Such differences 
may be exploited and heightened at the behest of political groups. In large urban 
areas the Muslim presence is resented not for religious reasons but becomes a 
source of tension due to competition in the job market. The limited opportunities 
caused by slow growth in the economy and higher levels of competition among 
communities can lead to increased frustration.  
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Right-wing Hindu organisations take advantage of this situation to create an 
environment of fear and jealousy among social groups. As Hasan (1982:33) 
observes: “The relative success and prosperity of Muslim businessmen in recent 
years was the cause of much antagonism in Moradabad. In the brassware trade, in 
particular, Muslims received extensive orders from West Asia which were 
perceived as an impetus to their trade and industry […] now had sufficient capital 
to purchase sophisticated tools, to own property, to spend on education, and to 
initiate new ventures. All this generated hostility among Hindu traders”.  
In 1962 during the Jabalpur riot, Congress Party local leaders were directly 
involved in the attack against Muslims but no action was taken against them. The 
1969 violence between Hindus and Muslims also took place in Gujarat. A year 
later in Bhivandi riots some 300 Muslims were killed. The Justice Madan 
Commission Report clearly implicated Shiv Sena in taking part in attacking 
Muslims and burning their property while police quietly looked on or encouraged 
the attackers but no action was taken on the basis of the judicial report. The 
Ahmedabad Commission of Inquiry into the 1969 communalist violence led by 
Justice P. Jagmohan Reddy from the Supreme Court, notes: “The agitation has 
received the blessing of the local Jana Sangh workers […] calling to sever all 
economic and social relations with the community that has attacked their religion 
viz. the Muslims”. The report by the Justice Vithayathil Commission of Inquiry on 
the Tellicherry disturbances in 1971 concluded: “I have no doubt that the RSS had 
taken an active part in rousing up anti-Muslim feeling among the Hindus of 
Tellicherry and in preparing the background for the disturbances”. Justice D.P. 
Madan, who led the Commission of Inquiry into the violent disturbances in 
Bhiwandi concluded: “the guiding spirit was Dr. Vyas [local Jana Sangh leader]”. 
(cited in Noorani, 2000:38)   
Justice P. Venugopal who led the Commission of inquiry into the communalist 
violence in Kanyakumari in 1982, wrote: “The RSS adopts a militant and 
aggressive attitude and sets itself up as the champion of what it considers to be the 
rights of Hindus against minorities”. (Cited in Engineer, 1995)  
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a qualitative change in the nature of 
communalist threats and violence. There is a large body of evidence pointing to the 
fact that the RSS and its affiliated organisations have consistently played a leading 
role in organising and inciting communalist hatred and violence. Various Judicial 
Commissions of inquiry on communalist violence have pointed towards the RRS. 
For instance, the Judicial Commissions on violence in Tellicherry (1971), Aligarh 
(1978), Moradabad (1980), Sambhal (1980) blames the RSS for inciting violence 
towards Muslims. These towns have witnessed some improvements in conditions; 
the Hindu traders resented any small improvements in the living conditions of the 
local Muslims and RSS involvement worsened the situation among the 
communities. Moreover, in many instances, community bias among the district 
administration and police seems to be evident from most accounts which highlight 
that they not only aided and abetted the rumours against Muslims but also 
perpetuated atrocities against them. The bias could be seen in refusing the stop the 
mobs from looting and killing. There seem to be lack of will to uphold the law as 
the state government has often failed to pursue matters and take any action against 
those involved.  
In Ferozabad, the bangle industries were owned by Hindus, while Muslims 
worked largely as craftsmen. However, a small minority among the Muslims began 
setting up as independent producers, and became seen as business competitors and 
a threat by the Hindu traders; in 1972 riots took place which led to the burning of 
businesses owned by the Muslim community. Here it seems that class conflicts 
were concealed as Hindu-Muslim religious conflict. 
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After the demolition of the Babri mosque, a number of incidents of 
communalist violence took place between Hindus and Muslims in most parts of 
India. In cities such as Bombay, the police supported by BJP and Shiv Sena 
actively took part in attacking Muslims (Srikrishna Commission, 1998). The RSS 
and BJP succeeded in stirring up hatred amongst the people of Gujarat. The tribals, 
Dalits and low caste Hindus traditionally supported the Congress Party, but the BJP 
worked among these groups in introducing a number of welfare programmes to 
gain their trust and support. The BJP was able to successfully construct a unified 
Hindu identity and make them feel proud of being a Hindu. 
The violence unleashed in the post-Godhra riots on 28th February 2002, after 
the burning alive of 58 innocent people on a train coach made common knowledge 
the complicity of state administration and police involvement in the attacks against 
the Muslim community. The violence continued for more than two months, with 
more than 2,000 Muslims losing their lives (Engineer, 2002). The worst attack 
against the Muslim community took place in 2002 in Gujarat in Naroda-Patia, 
which was a slum most of whose inhabitants were Muslims. In a mob attack by 
Hindus more than 100 Muslims were burnt alive in full view of the state police 
force. Women were raped before being burnt alive. Even pregnant women were not 
spared. In one particularly gruesome case a pregnant Muslim woman had her 
womb opened and the foetus was extracted and then burnt before she herself was 
burnt. (Engineer, 2002) Narendra Modi was then Gujarat‟s chief minister was a by-
stander while his close party associates took an active part in planning and carrying 
out the attacks on Muslims. In 2002, the BJP also ruled the Central government 
with Vajpayee as Prime Minister, and rather than taking action, he blamed the 
victims for this heinous crimes, despite his image as the soft face of Hindutva as 
required in such a diverse country as India. In fact, he never got rid of his RSS 
roots, as Vajpayee has said at a VHP meeting in Straten Island in New York: “RSS 
is my soul”. (Engineer, 2002) 
The Gujarat pogrom in 2002 represented a new departure from previous attacks 
on Muslims in the state because of the extensive evidence of a large-scale pre-
planned attack by the Hindu Right and of close collaboration amongst right-wing 
Hindu organisations, politicians and the police. This extensive planning and 
execution indicate that this was an attempt to annihilate Muslim businesses from 
the state. As Oza (2007:164-65) observes: “This extreme planning could only have 
been happened were this information collected and made available to Sangh [...] In 
the days after the most intensive violence was over, cities and towns emerged with 
completely destroyed homes, shops, and restaurants that often stood adjacent to 
places left untouched”. In Gujarat state, the Muslim minority were overwhelmingly 
the victims of pillage, murder and terror, resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 
men, women and children. Women, in particular, were subjected to brutal acts of 
violence and were left largely unprotected by the security forces. 
The Congress government failed to act decisively against communalists and 
despite regular occurrences of riots and attacks against minorities, especially 
Muslims over the course of nearly seven decades, no action has ever been taken 
against the perpetrators. The Government did set up Judicial Commissions 
whenever major violence riots took place to determine the causes and initiators of 
the riots. However, the government completely failed to implement the findings of 
these Commissions. Neither the Congress nor any other government has ever 
punished those who were guilty for these communal riots, despite them having 
been identified by the Judicial Commissions. There seems to be lack of will on the 
government side to protect minorities and side with the victims. This was also the 
case during the anti-Sikh riots which took place in November 1984 after the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi when more than 4,000 Sikhs were massacred. These 
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attacks on the Sikh community were led by Congress leaders in Delhi and other 
Indian cities (Singh, 2015). 
 
8. Institutional Bias 
Regarding the issue of protection of religious minorities against discrimination 
and existing mechanism for accountability Singh (2015:51) has argued: “The 
National Commission for Minorities constituted as late as 1993 – more than 43 
years after the formation of the Indian Republic in 1950 – remains a mere paper 
tiger without the power and institutional infrastructure to track systematic inbuilt 
bias against religion minorities […] Hindu majoritarian bias, pervades the Indian 
constitution, bureaucracy, security forces, parliamentary institutions, judiciary, 
prison, academic institutions, health services, media and cultural and art 
organisations”. 
Further, on the question of institutional communalism Singh (2015:52) observes 
that: “Institutional communalism became evident in the Supreme Court decision to 
award the death sentence to Mohammed Afzal Guru, a Kashmiri militant who was 
secretly hanged on 9th February 2013. The bench deciding his case said that the 
death sentence was necessary in order to satisfy „the national conscience‟, which is 
a surrender of legal reasoning to a structure of bias”.  
Manisha Sethi (2013) also finds systematic bias in the workings of the 
intelligence agency and police in their dealings with members of the religious 
minority communities, particularly Muslims, who have found to be the victims of 
these government agencies during Hindu mob attacks: “In the case of terror attacks 
or communalist riots, if the police go after the perpetrators of violence, and they 
happen to be mostly Muslims, you cannot, in the name of secularism, expect the 
police to act in proportion of their population”. (M.N. Singh, former Commissioner 
of Police, Mumbai, cited in Sethi, 2013) 
Virnda Grover notes that evidence collected shows there was clear Hindu bias 
in the working of the police and judiciary during the anti-Sikhs riots in 1984 in 
Delhi. The Congress government had protected the perpetrators of the violence and 
mass murders. The investigating agencies such as police, prosecutors and judiciary 
all collaborated to undermine justice (Singh, 2015). Further example of such bias 
could be seen in statements made by members of the judiciary, namely justice 
Sodhi, former Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, revealed in the public 
meeting in Chandigarh that “no Sikh judge was trusted to deal with the Sikh 
terrorist cases”. (Tribune, 2008, cited in Singh, 2015: 52) 
Police bias in Maharashtra state is not an isolated case. As Noorani (2014) 
notes: “A remarkable feature of the major riots which erupted in Uttar Pradesh 
state in 1972-73 was that they were not conflicts between the communities but 
cases of the PAC assaulting Muslims. Three of the riots – in Aligarh, Ferozabad 
and Varanasi during June 1972 – were due entirely to the Muslim protests on the 
AMU [Aligarh Muslim University] Amendment Act. Unchecked, the riots spread. 
In Nonari [a village in Azamgarh district] 72 Muslim homes were burnt down on 
November 15, 1972; in Sajni on December 12, about 100 Muslim were looted and 
43 were burnt. Some of the worst riots in Uttar Pradesh took place in 1972 when 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the Home portfolio”. 
Amnesty International drew attention to extra judicial killings carried out by the 
PAC in 1987: “On 22nd May several hundred men from the Hashimpura area of 
Meerut were seen being taken away in several trucks by PAC members. Witnesses 
said most were taken to local police stations but several dozen in the first two or 
three trucks were reportedly taken to the bank of the Upper Ganga canal near 
Muradnagar, shot and their bodies thrown in the water… eyewitnesses said the 
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bodies had been thrown in the canal by armed men in uniform”. (Cited in Noorani, 
2014) 
Justice B.N. Srikrishna‟s report on the Mumbai riots in 1992-93 notes the role 
played by the police: “The bias of policemen was seen in the active connivance of 
police constables with the rioting Hindu mobs on occasions, with their adopting the 
role of passive onlookers on occasions… This general apathy appears to be the 
outcome of the built-in prejudice in the mind of an average policeman that every 
Muslim is prone to crime”. (Srikrishna, cited in Noorani, 2014) 
A number of studies have been done on genocide in Gujarat and have recounted 
how Muslims were subjected to bloodshed, arson, rape and destruction to of their 
property whilst the law enforcement agencies, headed by then Chief Minister 
Narendra Modi, not only allowed such atrocities to take place but, in fact, advised 
the police not to attempt to stop the Hindu mob attacking Muslims. The former 
Congress MP Ehsan Jafri and some 69 Muslim women and children were attacked 
by a Hindu mob in the Gulberg Society massacre (Engineer, 2002; Siddiqui, 
2009b). To subvert justice public prosecutors were appointed to the investigation, 
who were known supporters of the RSS/BJP whilst judicial witnesses were 
pressurised not to give evidence. Fake encounter cases were also common in which 
Muslim youths were cold-bloodedly killed on fabricated charges. Under Mr Modi‟s 
watch things have been worse. And there has been no rehabilitation of the riot 
victims worth the name. (Lokhande, 2015) 
As Harsh Mander (2016) points out about the bias in the India‟s legal system: 
“We have studied the aftermath of many communal massacres since Independence, 
and what binds them all is the pattern that few, if any, are punished for these 
crimes. This is the outcome of the communal bias or apathy of all arms of the 
criminal justice system: The police, prosecution, and courts; and the political, 
social and economic powerlessness of the victims of communal crimes. Among the 
survivors of these crimes - many of whom fight epic and hopeless battles for justice 
like the widows of the 1984 Sikh massacre or the survivors of the 2002 Gujarat 
massacre… The selectivity of or popular outrage and the application of the majesty 
of the legal system reveals a very troubling underlying majoritarian bias in society 
and law. A majority of those charged with terror crimes are religious minorities. 
While a majority of those charged with communal crimes are from the majority 
Hindu community, its victims are mostly religious minorities. If law and social 
outrage apply so differently when the minority is charged with hate crimes from 
when they are the paramount victims of mass hate crimes, then the promises of a 
secular Constitution - of equal treatment of all before the law - stands exposed, in 
tatters”. 
Since assuming power in May 2014, Narendra Modi‟s government and his BJP 
politicians have created an atmosphere of intolerance and hatred in India that has 
surpassed the worst expectations of his many critics. (Siddiqui, 2014c) There has 
been an escalation of violence against Muslims and Christians, including the brutal 
lynching of a Muslim man in Dadri on suspicion of consuming beef. These events 
represent a direct assault on constitutionally protected freedom of speech and 
expression, and freedom of religion and belief. Intellectuals such as M. Kalburgi, 
G. Pansare and N. Dabholkar have recently been murdered in India. As a result, 
more than 50 writers have returned literary awards protest against the growing 
“intolerance” and to condemn the government‟s silence in the face of such (The 
Guardian, 2015) Moreover, as Amartya Sen emphasises, under Modi, government 
intervention in the nation‟s institutions “is more extensive, politically organised 
and connected with Hindutva movement [...] Often enough, the person chosen for 
heading institutions of national importance has been exceptionally dedicated to 
promoting Hindutva priorities” (Sen, 2015, cited in Noorani, 2015). 
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9. Conclusion 
This study finds that the ideology of the RSS is based on hatred of religious 
minorities, particularly Muslims using this „enemy‟, as a means to unite Hindus. 
Since independence in 1947 whenever the massacre of Muslims has taken place, 
the name of the RSS has been mentioned either in creating tension and disharmony 
among Hindus and Muslims, and/or taking part in these attacks on Muslims. 
Economic indicators highlight the plight and deterioration of the socio-economic 
conditions of Muslims in India. However, the RSS and its affiliate continue to 
oppose any policy measures to address these issues and to move towards inclusive 
development. As Dr. Ambedkar noted seven decades ago that, “If Hindu Raj does 
become a fact, it will, no doubt be the greatest calamity for this country. No matter 
what the Hindus say, Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On 
that account it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu raj must be prevented at any 
cost…they take every move to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, 
education and power…This attitude of keeping education, wealth and power as a 
close preserve for themselves and refusing to share it, which the high caste Hindus 
have developed in their relation with lower classes of Hindus, is sought to be 
extended by them to the Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place 
and power, as they have done to the lower class Hindus”. (Cited in Salam, 2016) 
The process of uneven development and deepening socio-economic crisis has 
created conditions of backwardness and poverty, which in turn had created an 
opportunity for right-wing Hindu organisations to organise people on the basis of 
religion. The study finds that with the adoption of neoliberal economic policy, 
India is surrendering its sovereignty to global finance capital. 
Indian Muslims have not been involved in Jehadi movements, as London based 
The Economist(2014) explains that Indian Muslims have remained moderate in 
spite of “reasons for some gloom: they endure lower levels of education, income, 
political representation or government jobs than the majority Hindus.” It suggested 
that a shared history of over a 1,000 years, a tradition of Sufi Islam and a recourse 
to a democratic framework along with a watchful State have kept Muslims 
moderate. However, the RSS/BJP is trying to divide the society along religious 
lines. This will shake the foundations of India‟s pluralistic character. These trends 
are dangerous, self-defeating and threaten India‟s security and well-being. 
The study suggests that in order to preserve the secular and democratic basis of 
India‟s constitution and pluralistic culture of society, it is important to unite all left 
and progressive forces to combat these fascist forces. Ensuring the safety of 
religious minorities and other underprivileged classes falls to left and progressive 
forces. Given that the overwhelming majority of people are poor and marginalised 
in India, it seems surprising that left-wing organisations are weak and unable to 
reach out to those people to whom their programmes and policies should prove 
most attractive.  
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